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is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries ...he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. 2

84 1

Under the Supreme Court standard, it seems that as long as the
officer acts reasonably, then a search of a defendant will be
lawful. This standard is less stringent than the New York
standard because the New York standard requires a combination
of factors before a police pursuit and subsequent recovery of
evidence will be allowed. Therefore, since Jerry C. passed the
stricter New York standard, it most definitely would pass the
federal standard set forth in Terry.
People v. Mondello 2842
(decided March 1, 1993)
The criminal defendant claimed that his right to peremptorily
challenge a potential juror during voir dire was violated when the
trial court determined that the challenge was based on racially
motivated grounds. 2843 The defendant also asserted that his right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 2844 was
violated when the police took a statement from him at the station
house before Miranda warnings were given. 2845 The second
department held that the trial court did not commit reversible
error by denying the defendant's peremptory challenge to a black

2841. Id. at 30.
2842. 191 A.D.2d 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1993).
2843. Id. at 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
2844. See U.S. CONST. amend IV, which provides that: "Tie right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . ." Id.; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12, which provides in part: "The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." Id.
2845. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d at 463-64, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289-90.
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juror.2 846 The appellate division also ruled that the defendant's
right against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated
because the defendant was not yet under arrest when he made his
2847
statement to the police.
During voir dire, the defendant's counsel made peremptory
challenges of all but one of the black prospective jurors, and did
not challenge persons of any other race. 284 8 Thus, when the
defense counsel challenged the last black potential juror, Juror
No. 2, the court determined that there was a prima facie showing
of racial discrimination. 2 84 9 When the court inquired as to his
reasons for the change, defense counsel gave subjective reasons
for the peremptory challenge of Juror No. 2, stating that he did
not like that juror. 2850 In response to further inquiry by the court
as to a racially-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge,
defense counsel stated that his act was only a "quid pro quo" to
the prosecutor's discriminatory challenges. 2851 Finally, after
further prompting by the court, defense counsel claimed that
Juror No. 2 was influenced by the publicity of the case. 2 852 The
trial court, however, found no support in the record that Juror
No. 2 would be unduly influenced by the surrounding publicity
2 853
and, therefore, denied the peremptory challenge.
It is well settled that the Federal and New York State
Constitutions prohibit the use of purposeful, racially
2854
discriminatory peremptory challenges by criminal defendants.
2846. Id. at 463, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289.

2847. Id. at 462, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
2848.
2849.
2850.
2851.
2852.
2853.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 462-63, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
Id. at 463, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
Id.
Id.

2854. See People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990). In Kern, the New York State
Court of Appeals held that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) applied to
the use of peremptory challenges by the defense. Id. at 653, 554 N.E.2d at
1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. It reasoned that both the Civil Rights Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution prohibited the use of
peremptory challenges by the defense to exclude persons of a particular race
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In Georgia v. McCollum, 2 85 5 the United States Supreme Court

reasoned that the harm to the excluded juror, the defendant, and
to the community would occur regardless of whether the defense
2 85 6
or prosecution used a discriminatory peremptory challenge.
The McCollum Court set forth a four-part test for determining
whether the Federal Constitution prohibited criminal defendants
2 857
from using racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.

The Court in McCollum concluded that a court cannot allow

jurors to be excluded by a racially-discriminatory peremptory
challenge, "be it at the hands of the State or the defense."2858
The Court also noted that the criminal defendant does not have a
2 859
constitutionally protected right to a peremptory challenge.

from the jury. Id. at 650-658, 554 N.E.2d at 1241-46, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653658. Specifically, the Kern court applied the Batson reasoning to find that to
allow racially-based peremptory challenges would harm the excluded juror, the
defendant, and society. Id. at 654, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
2855. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
2856. Id. at 2353.
2857. Id. The Court stated that the following must be considered:
First, whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges
in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by
Batson. Second, whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant constitutes state action. Third, whether prosecutors
have standing to raise this constitutional challenge. And fourth, whether
the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nevertheless preclude
the extension of our precedents to this case.
Id.
2858. Id. at 2354. The public perception would be that the State had excused
jurors because of race. Id. at 2356.
2859. Id. at 2358. The McCollum court stated that peremptory challenges
"are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury
and a fair trial. This court repeatedly has stated that the right to a peremptory
challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional
guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial." Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993) (New York legislated the requirement that
peremptory challenges be afforded to all parties in all criminal cases); N.Y.
CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1992) (New York Bill of Rights includes a
right that every person who qualifies under the law can serve on a jury and that
this right shall not be abridged based on race, creed, color, national origin or
gender and the abridgment of such right upon any of these basis' is a
misdemeanor). Id.
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In Mondello, there was prima facie evidence of discrimination
because the defendant only peremptorily challenged black
prospective jurors. 2 860 When a criminal defendant attempts to
exclude prospective jurors based on their race, both the New

York State and United States Constitutions apply the Batson test
requiring the prosecutor to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and the defendant to offer race-neutral reasons for
the challenges. The Mondello court followed both state and
federal precedent that prohibit both the prosecution and the
defense from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 2 861 In Mondello, since there was a prima facie
showing of discrimination by the defendant, the trial court seated

the juror in spite of defendant's objections. 2862 The appellate
division, deferred to the trial court's finding that the defense's

racially-neutral reasons were a mere pretext for a racially2 8 63

discriminatory purpose.
The defendant's second claim, that a statement he made to the
police before he was read his Miranda rights should have been

suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule, was also found to
be without merit. 2 8 6 4 A police officer approached Mondello with
his gun drawn, because the defendant's hands were out of view
2860. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d at 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289; see also People
v. Green, 181 A.D.2d 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1992) (finding prima
facie evidence of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges where black
defendant exercised 11 out of 13 peremptory challenges to exclude white
prospective jurors); cf People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 614 N.E.2d 709,
598 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1993). In Childress, the court held that the prima facie
prong of the Batson analysis requires defendant to demonstrate that facts exist
which imply that the prosecutor is attempting to exclude members of a
particular race from the jury panel using peremptory challenges. However, the
mere challenge of 2 of 3 potential black jurors, without more, may be found
by the trial judge to fall short of this standard. Id.
2861. Mondello, 191 A.D.2d at 462, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
2862. Id. at 462, 589 N.Y.S.2d 289. In Mondello, the prosecutor was able to
show a prima facie case of racially discriminatory use of defense's peremptory
challenges. The court found that the defense's "proffered excuse was a pretext
offered in an attempt to cover this discrimination. Id. at 463, 589 N.Y.S.2d
289. Thus, the court seated the juror so no discrimination would occur. Id.
2863. Id.
2864. Id.
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and because the defendant was believed to be armed and
dangerous. 2865 The defendant voluntarily consented to go to the
police station, where the defendant made his statement. 2 866 The
defendant argued that he had been placed under arrest, and since
no Miranda warnings had been given to him before he made his
statement, the statement should be suppressed. 2867 The appellate
court, however, agreed with the trial court that the defendant was
not under arrest when the police officer approached with gun
drawn because it was reasonable to believe that the defendant was
armed and dangerous. 2868
The appellate division relied on the analysis of its prior
decision, People v. Finlayson,2 869 stating that the reasonableness
of the protective means by which the police officer approached
was an important consideration in resolving search and seizure
issues. 2 870 In Finlayson, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, held that a police officer can hold a suspect at
gunpoint if there is a reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed a crime and a frisk is not feasible. 287 1 Therefore, the
Finlayson court held that evidence obtained as a result of the
defendant's detention at gunpoint was admissible. 2872 The
Finlayson court balanced a suspect's right to liberty2873 against a
police officer's right to perform his duties without fear of
unreasonable harm. 2 874

2865. Id. at 463, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
2866. Id. at 463-64, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 290.

2867. Id. at 463-464, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 289-290.
2868. Id. at 464, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
2869. 76 A.D.2d 670, 431 N.Y.S.2d 839 (2d Dep't 1980) cert. denied, 450
U.S. 931 (1981).

2870. Id. at 678, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 846. "To reconcile the officer's right of
self-protection with the citizen's right to personal liberty we need only look,
once again, to the constitutional standard of reasonableness." Id.
2871. Id. at 678-679, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 846-847. There is no arrest merely
because an officer approaches a person with gun drawn. Id. at 678, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 846.
2872. Id. at 682, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
2873. Id.
2874. Id. at 678, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
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Similarly, in People v. Chestnut,2875 the New York Court of
Appeals reasoned that a police officer investigating a crime has
the right to "ensure their safety," 2876 and that "the presence of

[a] drawn gun [does not necessarily] transform [a] stop and frisk
of [a] defendant into an arrest." 2 877 In Chestnut, police officers

were justified in approaching the defendant with guns drawn and
ordering the defendant to lie on the ground because they had
reason to believe a crime had been committed. 2878 The court held
that a statement made by the defendant in response to the
officer's question was admissible even though no Miranda
warnings were given because the stop and frisk was not custodial
interrogation. 2879

Thus, New York State and Federal case law recognize that an
officer's safety is a factor to be considered in resolving Fourth
Amendment issues. It is the standard of reasonableness that is
used to judge a police officer's action in dealing with the
public. 2880 The Mondello court followed this precedent by
finding that a police officer's approach with gun drawn did not
effect an arrest requiring probable cause and Miranda warnings,
in order to admit the defendant's statement.

2875. 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1980) cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980).
2876. Id. at 21, 409 N.E.2d at 961, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
2877. Id. at 21, 409 N.E.2d at 962, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 489. See People v.
Price, 194 A.D.2d 634, 599 N.Y.S.2d 45 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that police
can approach suspect with guns drawn to protect themselves where there is
reasonable belief that suspect is dangerous); People v. Hardy, 146 A.D.2d
800, 537 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding that police officer's approach
with gun drawn did not convert a confrontation into an arrest when officer
acted reasonably towards an armed and dangerous suspect).
2878. 51 N.Y.2d at 22, 409 N.E.2d at 962, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
2879. Id. at 23 n.8, 409 N.E.2d at 463 n.8, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 490 n.8.
2880. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d
210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
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